Hedge Fund Ownership and Corporate Financial Misconduct by Zhao, Xin




Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Chair of Committee, Yong Chen




Head of Department, Sorin M. Sorescu
December 2016
Major Subject: Finance
Copyright 2016 XIN ZHAO
ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies whether hedge funds are proficient at avoiding investing in
firms that conduct financial fraud. Using 13F quarterly holdings data from 1980 to 2012,
we find that hedge funds have significantly lower ownership (34% less) in fraud firms
over the course of violation period, relative to non-fraud firms and non-fraud quarters.
Furthermore, less ownership by hedge funds for fraud firms also occurs one year before
the fraud is revealed to the public, and hedge funds continue to divest from fraud firms
until the pre-revelation quarter. In contrast, non-hedge fund institutional investors do not
show any significant pattern in their holdings in fraud firms around violation period.
A panel logistic regression modeling the probability of fraud indicates that both the
level and change in hedge fund ownership can predict fraudulent activities. One standard
deviation increase in hedge fund ownership will decrease the odds of conducting fraud by
21.7%.
Next, we test the relationship between fraudulent severity and hedge fund holdings.
Using total fine as a proxy for fraud severity, we find that, in the cross section, the more
severe the fraud is, the less hedge fund ownership is in the firm.
We also develop three alternative measures for hedge fund holdings that represent bet-
ter monitoring incentive. We demonstrate that hedge funds with greater incentives to mon-
itor the firms show a larger ownership decrease in fraud firms around violation period.
Finally, we show that the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure does not affect
hedge funds’ ability to divest from fraud firms around the violation period.
Taken together, our findings suggest that hedge funds are proficient at avoiding invest-
ing in fraud firms, while non-hedge fund institutions mostly react to public news.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The past three decades witnessed a dramatic shift in investment in the United States
from retail investors to institutional investors as the dominant player. 1 In particular, hedge
funds have become an important investment vehicle, distinct with traditional institutional
investors such as banks and mutual funds. These changes have spurred numerous studies
on hedge funds from different aspects. Thus far, many papers (e.g., Ackermann, McEnally
and Ravenscraft (1999), Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), Agarwal, Jiang, Tang
and Yang (2013), and Chen, Cliff and Zhao (2015)) have shown evidence of superior per-
formance among hedge funds. Furthermore, Chen and Liang (2007) and Cao, Chen, Liang
and Lo (2013) find evidence that a portion of hedge funds have the ability to enter and exit
stock markets at opportune times by successfully predicting market conditions such as
market return, volatility, and liquidity. In addition, several studies investigate the influence
of hedge funds as shareholders on corporate operations. For example, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy
and Thomas (2008) find that hedge fund activism increases firm value, while Jiang, Li
and Wang (2012) show that in the Chapter 11 process, hedge funds strategically choose
positions in the capital structure to increase their impact on firm value. These studies have
tremendously advanced our understanding about hedge funds.
In this dissertation, we look at a new and important aspect of the relation between
hedge funds and firms: the behavior of hedge funds as shareholders of companies that
engage in financial misconduct. Fraudulent activities in firms are risky in the sense that
once the actions are caught and revealed, the firms will incur huge losses. Karpoff, Lee
and Martin (2008b) show that though fines imposed by authorities are at a modest amount
of $23.5 million per firm on average, penalties by the market are as high as 7.5 times of
1According to Barclay Hedge, the total assets under management by hedge funds exceed 2.7 trillion US
dollars as of the end of 2016 Q1.
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the amount charged by authorities. And such loss can transfer to investors who possess
positions in fraudulent firms. Therefore, avoiding investment in a fraud firm or divesting
from the firm at right times should be very important for investors’ welfare.
In particular, we address the following questions: can hedge funds ferret out corporate
financial misconduct? If so, do hedge funds have a better ability to anticipate firm miscon-
duct than other types of institutional investors? Do hedge funds divest more from firms
whose fraudulent activities are more severe? Finally, will Regulation Fair Disclosure have
an impact on the trading behaviors of institutional investors around fraud period? Answers
to these questions will complement the existing evidence and contribute to both the hedge
funds and corporate misconduct literature. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to
study the detection ability of hedge funds for firm misconduct.
First, using 13F quarterly holdings data from 1980 to 2012, we first find that hedge
funds have significantly lower ownership in fraud firms since four quarters before fraud
starts, and the low holdings in fraud firms continue over the violation period, which ranges
from the fraud-beginning quarter to the end of fraud quarter. 2 However, non-hedge funds
(i.e., banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, investment advisors, and other institu-
tional investors combined) do not show any significant pattern in their holdings in fraud
firms around violation period.
Second, we employ a panel logistic regression modeling the probability of fraud. We
find that one standard deviation increase in hedge fund ownership will decrease the odds
of conducting fraud by 21.7%. Also, one standard deviation increase in hedge fund net
purchase is associated with a reduction in the odds of committing fraud by 6.4%.
Third, we test the relationship between fraudulent severity and hedge fund holdings.
Using the ratio of total fine to firm equity as a proxy for fraud severity, we find that, in the
cross section, hedge funds invest less in firms whose fraudulent activities are proved to be
2In this paper, we use the terms “misconduct”, “misrepresentation”, and “fraud” interchangeably.
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more severe, ex-post. This negative relationship exists in each of five testing quarters that
range from two quarters before to two quarters after fraud begins.
Fourth, given the fact that hedge funds show significant variations in their ability and
operation focus, we develop three alternative measures of hedge fund holdings that are
more aligned with their incentives to monitor. We find that hedge funds with greater
incentives to monitor firms show a larger decrease of ownership in fraud firms around
violation period.
Finally, we show that Regulation Fair Disclosure does not significantly impede hedge
fund managers from detecting financial misconduct. The finding suggests that hedge funds
that divest from fraud firms before fraud begins probably do not rely purely on the set of
information disclosed through Reg FD.
Taken together, the results are consistent with the notion that hedge funds have the
ability to divest from fraud firms around violation period in anticipation of fraudulent ac-
tivities. However, non-hedge funds appear to behave remarkably different, and the pattern
of stock ownership by non-hedge funds in fraud firms suggests that non-hedge funds pri-
marily react to public news instead of possessing superior information about firms.
Our study contributes to the existing literature on how institutional investors respond
to corporate financial fraud. Karpoff and Lou (2010) focus on the period when misconduct
is revealed to the public and show that short interest starts to increase 19 months before
financial misconduct is made public, and conclude that some short sellers are proficient at
detecting financial misrepresentation. Though hedge funds constitute a substantial portion
of short sellers, other types of institutional investors are allowed to take short positions
as well. 3 Thus, we cannot simply equalize hedge funds to short sellers. The nature of
short interest data does not allow for knowing the identity of short sellers. Our paper uses
3For example, Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004) report that by 2000, there are about 30%
of mutual funds that do not have restrictions on taking short positions.
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13F data on long positions in stocks. One advantage of using long positions in 13F data
is that we can clearly identify institution types and calculate institutional holdings in each
firm. Therefore, our study on long positions complements Karpoff and Lou (2010) by
examining if institutional investors have skills at detecting fraud by avoiding investment
in fraud firms or divest from the fraud firm at right times.
In addition, by studying institutional investors and accounting fraud, Larson (2008)
finds that all institutional ownership does not act as a sufficient monitoring channel to pre-
vent firm fraud. However, Larson does not distinguish between hedge funds and other
institutional investors, which is one of our focuses of the paper. As shown in Cao, Chen,
Goetzmann and Liang (2013), hedge funds perform very differently from other types of
institutional investors in financial markets. In this aspect, our paper complements Lar-
son (2008) by distinguishing between hedge funds and other institutions on their trading
behavior around fraud-related periods.
Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan (2011) use the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases (AAERs) data by SEC to study earnings misstatements. They find that account-
ing and auditing misconduct could be predicted with financial and non-financial informa-
tion, stock market data, and accrual quality. They also show that during the misstatement
period, firms’ accrual quality is low and both financial and non-financial performances
worsen. The sample we use is much richer and larger than the one employed by Dechow,
Ge, Larson and Sloan (2011). We also adopt some variables presented in Dechow, Ge,
Larson and Sloan (2011) as controls in our tests.
Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2010) show that detecting fraud does not rely on regular
corporate governance such as monitoring but nontraditional “players” such as employees,
media, and industry regulators. Our study points out hedge funds as another type of players
who can anticipate corporate financial misconduct.
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in
4
the study. In Section 3, we present the main empirical results for both hedge funds and
non-hedge funds. Finally, Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
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2. THE DATA
This dissertation employs several sets of data, namely, financial misconduct informa-
tion at firm level (FSR), stock ownership data of all institutional investors who file 13F
(13F), stock performance from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP), and
financial and short interest data from COMPUSTAT. Each of them is briefly described be-
low.
2.1 Corporate Financial Misconduct Data
We obtain financial misconduct data (Federal Securities Regulation Database, here-
after FSR) from the Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a, b) (hereafter KLM), and Karpoff,
Koester, Lee and Martin (2014) (hereafter KKLM).1 FSR covers 1,099 hand-collected
cases identified in the four popular databases including (1) the Government Accountabil-
ity Office (GAO), (2) the Audit Analytics (AA) database of restatement announcements,
(3) the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) database of securities class action
lawsuits, and (4) the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Accounting and Au-
diting Enforcement Releases (AAERs). KKLM address four problems associated with
the aforementioned databases, which are late initial revelation dates, scope limitations,
potentially extraneous events, and complete and partial data omissions.
To be included in FSR dataset, a firm must have at least one violation of Section
13(b)(2)(a), 13(b)(2)(b) or 13(b)(5) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 2
To fit in the scope of our study, we restrict the sample to firms with available (1)
1I would like to thank Jonathan Karpoff, Allison Koester, Scott Lee, and Gerald Martin for generously
providing me with the FSR data.
2See Karpoff, Koester, Lee and Martin (2014) for detail.
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common stocks, (2) at least have one of following identifiers: Actpermno, Actgvkey and
Actcusip, and (3) at least have some data in all of the CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and 13F. We
use Actpermno as the primary identifier to merge with the other datasets. If Actpermno is
missing, Actgvkey will be utilized, and then Actcusip if the first two identifiers are both
missing. As a result, we locate 916 fraud firms in FSR. This number further reduces to
808 after we merge them with the CRSP and 13F.
Figure 1 shows the timeline of one enforcement action. A typical misconduct will in-
clude a violation beginning date when a fraud occurs, a misconduct ending date when the
fraudulent activity finishes, then followed by a revelation event when the misconduct is
revealed to the public. Subsequently, a formal investigation by the SEC usually follows.
At the time of a violation, a misconduct is often not known to the public. After a formal
investigation starts, the SEC may drop the case upon its discretion, and this case does not
show up in the sample. Since we do not have a reason to speculate that hedge fund own-
ership is associated with the probability the case is dropped, there should be no selection
bias in the study.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of fraud firms at the pre-fraud quarter end. The
mean violation period lasts 36 months, while the median is 24 months. The average
duration from misconduct beginning to fraud revelation is 37 months. The average of
the total monetary fines imposed on fraud firms is $110.2 million, and the median is
only $2.38 million, suggesting a large skewness in the distribution of the total mon-
etary penalty. The total penalty is defined as the sum of several variables including
emp disgorge, nonemp disgorge, emp fine, nonemp fine, firm disgorge, firm fine, clsamt-
tot, clsvaltot. The definition of the above fine items are as follows, emp disgorge repre-
sents the total amount of disgorgement regulators ordered to be paid by employees of the
firm named as respondents in the enforcement action; nonemp disgorge represents the to-
tal amount of disgorgement regulators ordered to be paid by non-employees of the firm
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named as respondents in the enforcement action; emp fine represents the total amount of
fines regulators ordered to be paid by employees of the firm named as respondents in the
enforcement action; nonemp fine represents the total amount of fines regulators ordered
to be paid by non-employees of the firm named as respondents in the enforcement action;
firm disgorge represents the total amount of disgorgement regulators ordered to be paid by
agent firms named as respondents in the enforcement action; firm fine represents the total
amount of fines regulators ordered to be paid by agent firms named as respondents in the
enforcement action; clsamttot represents the total cash settlement awarded in all related
private civil class action lawsuit; clsvaltot represents the total value of equity shares all
parties are providing as settlement to the class in a related private civil class action law-
suit. An agent firm is any firm named by regulators in the enforcement action other than a
subsidiary or parent firm.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of financial misconducts across the Fama-French 48
industries at the end of the pre-fraud month. Business service is the most “fraud-prone”
sector in terms of frequency (103 cases), followed by Retail (37 cases), Banks (32 cases),
Wholesale (31 cases) and Electronic Equipment (31 cases). The top five “fraud-concentrated”
industries account for 39% of all misconduct firms in the sample. In most analyses below,
we control for the industry fixed effect by including an industry dummy.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of financial misconducts across the Fama-French 48
industries at the end of the pre-revelation month. Again, business service is the most
“fraud-prone” sector regarding frequency (113 cases), followed by Wholesale (44 cases),
Electronic Equipment (40 cases), Retail (36 cases) and Banks (34 cases). The top five
“fraud-concentrated” industries account for 42% of all misconduct firms in the sample.
Figure 4 plots the distribution of violation start years over time. The majority of vio-
lations occurred between 1998 and 2001. As explained before, our study focuses on two
dates: violation beginning date, and revelation date when misconduct is revealed to the
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public. Given the time-series variation in frauds shown in the figure, we also control for
the time effect in regression analyses below by adding a time dummy.
Figure 5 plots the distribution of violation revelation years over time. The majority of
violations was revealed to the public between 2000 and 2002, as well as 2005 and 2006.
2.2 Stock Ownership by Hedge Funds and Other Institutional Investors
The institutional ownership information is from Thomson Reuters Ownership Database
(Form 13F). The SEC requires that all investment managers with discretion over $100 mil-
lion or more report their equity positions to the SEC on Form 13F. All equity positions
greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed. Institutional ownership (here-
after IOR) for each stock in each quarter is defined as the total number of shares held by
institutional investors at the quarter end divided by the total number of shares outstanding.
To correct the problem that there are some late filings after 45-day deadline set by the SEC
and potential stock splits that have occurred between the end of the reported quarter and
the filing date, we undo this split adjustment using share adjustment factors from CRSP.
Another potential problem is missing holdings in 13F. We follow Nagel (2005) to impute
zero holdings for the missing observations in 13F. Specifically, if there are market data for
a firm at a quarter end in CRSP, but no holding information for the corresponding quarter
in 13F, then we will assign a zero holding for the quarter. As a robustness check, we do
not impute the missing holdings in 13F; the inferences do not change. We remove all ob-
servations that holding levels exceed 100%. These observations account for less than 2%
in the sample. The sample period ranges from the first quarter of 1980 to the last quarter
of 2012.
The 13F ownership data classify institutional investors into five groups: Banks, Insur-
ance Companies, Investment Companies, Independent Investment Advisers, and Others.
9
However, there are several potential problems. First, the classification code is not accurate
after 1998. To correct this issue, we adopt Bushee’s (1998, 2001) classification code.3
Bushee (1998, 2001) extends the classification code of institutional investors into newer
dates. We also follow Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bushee (2001) to treat institutions
whose institution type code is 3 or 4 as mutual funds, unless they are identified as hedge
funds below. Second, hedge funds are not classified separately. In the paper, we identify
hedge funds by manually matching 13F institutional investors’ names with a comprehen-
sive list of hedge fund names obtained from Cao, Chen, Goetzmann and Liang (2013).4
Figure 6 shows the gradual increase of institutional ownership from 1980 to 2012. An
average stock had about 14% institutional ownership in 1980, and this number increased to
almost 60% at the end of 2012. Over the sample period, hedge funds experienced dramatic
growth in stock markets. The average ownership by hedge funds increased from almost
zero to about 9% in 2012.
2.3 Stock Performance and Firm Characteristics
We follow Gompers and Metrick (2001) and calculate firm characteristics as follows.
SP500: S&P inclusion dummy, a dummy variable equals one if the firm is an S&P 500
component at the quarter end and zero otherwise;
Book-to-market: book value for the fiscal year ended before the most recent June 30,
divided by size as of December 31 during that fiscal year;
Dividend Yield: dividends for the fiscal year ended before the most recent June 30,
divided by size as of December 31 during that fiscal year;
Price: share price at the quarter end;
3I would like to thank Brian Bushee for generously providing me with the extended institution type’s
data.
4See Cao, Chen, Goetzmann and Liang (2013) for the detailed identification of hedge funds.
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Size: price * number of shares outstanding at the quarter end;
Age: number of months since first return observation appears in CRSP data;
Volatility: volatility of monthly returns over the past two years;
MOM3: past three-month gross returns;
MOM9: nine-month gross return preceding the quarter of filing (i.e., June 30-March
31 return for a June 30 13F filing in the following year;
Turnover: trading volume divided by shares outstanding, measured for the month prior
to the beginning of the quarter.
We follow Shumway (1997) and make adjustment on the missing delisting returns on
CRSP to correct returns for delisting bias.
To ease explanation, we follow Gompers and Metrick (2001) to take the natural log
of firm characteristics except for S&P inclusion dummy and two past return variables
(MOM3 and MOM9). For dividend yield and turnover, we follow Cao, Chen, Goetzmann
and Liang (2013) to add one to the values before taking logs.
2.4 Short Interest
COMPUSTAT provides supplementary data on short interest. For each month, there
are two short interests reported at the mid and at the end of the month (for old dates there
is only one data point per month). We calculate short ratio as the short interest reported
divided by the shares outstanding on the same date. Monthly short ratio is the average
of the two (one for early dates) in each month. Then quarterly short ratio will be the last
monthly short ratio in that quarter. We also calculate the average of monthly short ratios
within the quarter as an alternative quarterly short interest ratio measure.
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2.5 Discretionary Accrual
We follow Jones (1991) to calculate the discretionary accrual by regressing the follow-
ing model.
TAit = α1 + α2(∆REVit) + α3(PPEit) + it (2.1)
where
TA = total accruals in year t,
∆REV = revenues in year t - revenues in year t-1,
PPE = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t.
All three variables are scaled by lagged total assets. The discretionary accruals are the
residuals from the regression of the model.
We also use a performance adjusted Jones model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005))
to calculate an alternative discretionary accrual.
Following the routine, we winsorize book-to-market, dividend yield, and discretionary
accrual at both the 1st and the 99th percentiles, and short ratio at the upper 1% level. Table
2 reports summary statistics of firm characteristics for 600 fraud firms that exist in their
pre-fraud quarters. On average, a fraud firm has a hedge fund ownership of 2.62%, while
the mean holding by a non-hedge fund is much larger at 31.91%. In addition, only 15%
of the fraud firms are the S&P 500 member stocks, suggesting that the majority of fraud
firms are small ones.
Table 3 reports summary statistics of firm characteristics for 627 fraud firms that exist
in their pre-revelation quarters. On average, fraud firms have a mean hedge fund ownership
of 3.66%, a 40% increase from the pre-fraud quarter, and a mean holding of non-hedge
funds at 32.61%. The median of hedge fund holdings increases by 28% from the pre-fraud
12
period.
From pre-fraud to pre-revelation quarters, fraud firms have several notable changes.
The mean fraud firms’ price decreases from $21.70 to $16.31, representing a 20% drop.
The mean market capitalization shrinks 23% to $3.88 billion. Both average short-term
momentum (MOM3) and long-term momentum (MOM9) reduce sharply from fraud be-
ginning to misconduct revelation. The mean short ratio increases from 2% to 3% at pre-
revelation quarters, a 50% increase. The mean of discretionary accruals at the pre-fraud
quarters is 0, and this value jumps to 0.04 at the end of pre-revelation quarters. Further-
more, the means of volatility, turnover, book-to-market, and dividend yield of fraud firms
do not show dramatic changes from pre-violation quarters to pre-revelation quarters.
13
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct several empirical tests. First, we do a univariate analysis on
institutional ownerships (IOR) at the pre-fraud quarter ends. Second, we study the relation
between IOR and fraud by performing panel regressions of IOR on a few fraud-related
dummy variables. Third, we perform similar regressions using quarterly change in insti-
tutional ownership. Fourth, we conduct a logit analysis to model the probability of fraud.
Fifth, we study the relationship between fraud severity and hedge fund holdings. Sixth,
we develop three alternative hedge fund holdings that are more aligned with incentives to
monitor and make comparisons among different measures. Finally, we analyze the impact
of Regulation Fair Disclosure on hedge funds’ ability to detect fraud.
3.1 Institutional Ownership Around the Fraud-Beginning Quarter
To test whether IOR levels for fraud firms differ from non-fraud firms at the pre-fraud
quarter ends, we first conduct a univariate analysis on the IOR. Table 4 Panel A reports the
univariate test results at the pre-fraud quarter. The ownership by all types of institutional
investors for fraud firms at the quarter immediately prior to committing frauds is 34.53%,
compared to 28.93% for non-fraud firms and fraud firms in other periods. The difference
of 5.6% is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. However, the average IOR level
by hedge funds in the fraud firms is 2.62% at the pre-fraud quarter, which is 0.58% lower
than the IOR for the non-fraud firms and fraud firms in other quarters. The difference is
statistically significant at the 1% level.
Next, we limit the sample to only fraud firms and calculate the mean of the IOR during
the violation period, which is defined as quarters from fraud beginning to misconduct end
and the average of the IOR for the rest of quarters. The results are shown in Table 4
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Panel B. There are totally 44,365 fraud firm-quarter observations, among which 8,013 are
fraud quarters and 36,352 are non-fraud quarters. Models (1) - (3) test for IOR by all
institutional investors, non-hedge fund investors, and hedge funds, respectively. The mean
IOR by all institutional investors during the violation period is 2.37% higher than IOR at
other quarters and is statistically significant at 1% level. The IOR level by hedge funds
during the violation period is 3.35%, which is 0.49% lower than IOR for other quarters.
And this difference is also statistically significant at 1% level.
In the last univariate test, we study a net purchase by institutional investors in each
quarter, which is denoted as the first difference in quarterly holdings. We calculate the
average of the net purchases by institutional investors right before the fraud-beginning
quarter, and the mean of the net purchases in other quarters. The results are shown in
Table 4 Panel C. The average of net investment by hedge funds at the pre-fraud quarters
(0.14%) is not statistically significantly different from the mean of the net purchases in
other quarters (0.08%) at 10% level.
The results in Table 4 could suggest that (1) hedge funds have relatively smaller own-
ership in fraud firms at the quarter immediately before a misconduct begins, compared to
their holdings in other quarters, whereas non-hedge funds and all institutional investors
may have an opposite behavior. (2) hedge funds have lower ownership in fraud firms dur-
ing violation period than other periods. (3) the mean net purchases by hedge funds at the
pre-fraud quarter end is not significantly different from the mean in other quarters.
A potential problem with univariate tests, however, is that they do not control for the
time trend that institutional investors increase their holdings steadily from less than 15% in
1980 to over 50% at the end of 2012, as well as firm-specific characteristics that can affect
institutional ownership. The univariate analyses are difficult to distinguish whether the low
IOR of hedge funds for fraud firms in pre-fraud periods is due to hedge funds’ ability to
detect financial misconduct or due to a time trend, industry effect, or other firm fixed effect.
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To control for other factors, we perform a panel regression analysis. Gompers and Metrick
(2001) find that institutional ownership is associated with several stock characteristics such
as SP500 dummy, firm age, firm equity size, book-to-market ratio, dividend yield, stock
momentum, stock price, stock volatility, and turnover. Karpoff and Lou (2010) show
that short interests are related to corporate financial fraud. Furthermore, a large body of
academic literature studies the motivation for earnings management, and how to define
earnings management (Healy (1985), Jones (1991), Patricia M. Dechow (1995), Kothari,
Leone and Wasley (2005)). Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan (2011) show that accruals,
which measure earnings management, could predict accounting misstatement. We include
these variables in the analyses. Specifically, we run the following panel regressions.
IOR HFit =α + β1Begin(4)it + β2Begin(3)it + β3Begin(2)it
+ β4Begin(1)it + β5V iolationPeriodDummyit
+ γ1SP500it + γ2MOM3it + γ3MOM9it + γ4logsizeit
+ γ5logBMit + γ6logyldit + γ7logprcit + γ8logvolit + γ9logageit
+ γ10logturnoverit + γ11shortratioit + γ12|DAccrual|it + it,
(3.1)
where IOR HF is the quarterly institutional ownership level by hedge fund investors; Be-
gin(i) is a quarter dummy equals one when the firm is a fraud firm and the quarter is in the
ith quarter before fraud-beginning quarter, and zero otherwise. For example, Begin(3) = 1
if the firm is a fraud firm and the quarter is the third quarter before fraud starts and zero
otherwise; Violation Period Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if and the firm is
a fraud firm and the quarter is in the violation period, and zero otherwise. Violation period
is a period of quarters in fraud.
The control variables are described in Section 2. Positive accruals are income-increasing
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accruals, while negative accruals are income-decreasing accruals. Both discretionary ac-
cruals regardless of the sign are forms of earnings management and would attract the
SEC’s attention. Therefore we follow Reichelt and Wang (2010) to calculate absolute
values of discretionary accruals in the model.
If an investor can somehow gather information about firms and use sophisticated skills
to predict a fraud based on information collected, he will reduce his positions in the fraud
firm and reallocate investment accordingly. Therefore, we expect to find a relatively lower
level of hedge fund ownership over the course of violation period as well as quarters before
misrepresentation for fraud firms if such skills exist.
Table 5 reports the panel regression results of hedge fund ownership. Models (1) – (3)
are the panel regressions of total institutional ownership, non-hedge fund ownership, and
hedge fund ownership on pre-fraud quarter dummies, violation period dummy and firm
controls, respectively.
Models (1) - (4) are panel regression models that adopt different control variables.
Hedge fund managers have on average a 0.6% - 1.1% lower ownership in fraud firms
during the violation period than non-fraud firms and other quarters, depend on different
models. Also, hedge funds hold fewer shares in fraud firms since as early as four quarters
before fraud begins in all the four models. Take model (4) for example - the coefficient
of one-quarter-before-fraud dummy (begin(1)) is -0.009 (t-statistic=-3.47). At the quarter
right before fraud begins, hedge funds on average have 0.9% lower holdings in fraud firms
than in non-fraud firms. Given the fact that hedge funds have a mean quarterly holding of
3.2% over the sample period, hedge fund investors decrease their holdings in fraud firms
by 28% at the quarter before fraud starts, and the decrease is statistically significant at 1%
level.
With the same idea, hedge funds reduce their ownership in fraud firms by 34% over the
course of violation period, and the reduction is statistically significant at 1% level as well.
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The coefficients on the dummies for the other quarters in the model generate a similar
impression. The common observation is that relative to other firm-quarters, hedge funds
have significantly lower ownership of fraud firms as early as four quarters before fraud
starts, and the pattern continues to the whole violation period. The pattern seems to imply
that hedge funds can avoid owning much of a firm when it starts to engage in financial
misconduct.
Also, the ownership of hedge funds is related to several stock characteristics. For ex-
ample, hedge funds tend to hold stocks that do not belong to the S&P 500 membership.
Also, the hedge fund ownership is negatively related to dividend yield, but positively asso-
ciated with firm age, firm size, book-to-market ratio, share price, stock turnover, and short
interest ratio. Finally, hedge fund ownership is not related to stock momentum as well as
volatility.
All firm, industry, and time effect are included and standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by both firm and quarter. (Petersen
(2009))
To make a comparison among different institutional investors, we re-run the model 3.1
and replace the dependent variable (IOR HF) with the total institutional holding (IOR Total)
and the non-hedge fund holding (IOR NonHF). The results are summarized in Table 6.
On the contrary, Table 6 shows that non-hedge fund and total institutional holdings
do not have any significant patterns around the fraud periods. None of the coefficients on
the four pre-fraud quarter dummies and the violation period dummy is significant at 10%
level. Moreover, non-hedge funds exhibit some different preferences for firm characteris-
tics compared to hedge funds. For instance, non-hedge funds tend to hold stocks with less
momentum and less volatility. And non-hedge funds holdings are not sensitive to stock
turnover or discretionary accruals.
18
3.2 Institution Ownership Around the Violation Revelation
The previous results in Section 3.1 show that hedge funds reduce their ownership in
fraud firms as early as four quarters before fraud starts and the trend continues to the
violation periods. In contrast, non-hedge funds and total institutional holdings do not
show any significant patterns around fraud quarters. At the early stage of fraud, investors
have little information on the fraudulent activity. When the time is close to the revelation
of misconduct, investors will have more information and start to detect the potential fraud.
Now we switch gear and study the trading behavior of institutional investors around fraud
revelation period.
We apply the same setup in Section 3.1 to the fraud revelation period. Specifically, we
estimate the following regressions.
IOR HFit =α + β1Reveal(−4)it + β2Reveal(−3)it + β3Reveal(−2)it
+ β4Reveal(−1)it + β5Reveal(0)it + β6Reveal(+1)it
+ β7Reveal(+2)it + β8Reveal(+3)it + β9Reveal(+4)it
+ γ1SP500it + γ2MOM3it + γ3MOM9it + γ4logsizeit
+ γ5logBMit + γ6logyldit + γ7logprcit + γ8logvolit + γ9logageit
+ γ10logturnoverit + γ11shortratioit + γ12|DAccrual|it + it,
(3.2)
where IOR HF is hedge fund ownership, Reveal(i) is the ith quarter after fraud reve-
lation. For example, Reveal(+4) =1 if the firm is a fraud firm and the quarter is the fourth
quarter after fraud-revelation.
The regression results are shown in Table 7. Hedge funds tend to hold relatively fewer
shares in fraud firms during each of the four quarters before the fraud is revealed to the
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public, but do not show any notable change in holdings since then. For example, the
coefficient of one-quarter-before-revelation dummy for the model (4) in Table 7 is -0.007,
and t-statistic is -2.42, which is significant 5% level. The mean hedge fund holdings in
fraud firms in the quarter right before fraud revelation is 0.7% lower than holdings in
non-fraud firms.
To test whether institutional investors other than hedge funds will change their holdings
in response to ex-post fraud revelation, we re-run the Model 3.2 but replace hedge fund
holdings with total institutional and non-hedge fund holdings. Table 8 shows the panel
regression results.
Non-hedge funds start to reduce their holdings in fraud firms right before misconduct
revelation and continue to keep lower ownership until one year after fraud revelation.
For example, the coefficient of fraud revelation dummy is -0.021, and t-statistic is -2.33.
During the fraud revelation quarter, non-hedge funds’ ownership in fraud firms is 2.1%
lower than that in non-fraud firms. Given that the mean of non-hedge fund ownership
levels is 25.7%, non-hedge funds reduce their holdings by 8.2% in the quarter immediately
prior to the revelation. And this reduction is statistically significant at 5% level.
So far, the results show that hedge funds tend to reduce their ownership in fraud firms
since four quarters before misconduct starts and the trend continues to the quarter right
before the fraud is revealed to the public. After the fraud revelation, hedge funds’ hold-
ings do not show a further reduction. On the contrary, non-hedge funds do not have any
notable changes in the holdings in fraud firms around the period when fraud starts, but
significantly decrease their holdings since fraud is revealed to the public.
3.3 Changes in Institution Ownership Around the Violation Period
Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that institutional holdings are positively related to
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future stock returns, and argue that both institutional ownership level and change in the
level may drive future returns. In anticipation of a financial fraud an investor may not only
reduce his position in the potentially fraudulent firm but reduces his net purchase, which
is the change in quarterly ownership level in that firm. In this section, we test whether
institutional investors will have different trading patterns in terms of changes in quarterly
holdings (net purchases). Specifically, we run the panel regressions as below.
∆IOR it =α + β1Begin(4)it + β2Begin(3)it + β3Begin(2)it
+ β4Begin(1)it + β5V iolationPeriodDummyit
+ γ1SP500it + γ2MOM3it + γ3MOM9it + γ4logsizeit
+ γ5logBMit + γ6logyldit + γ7logprcit + γ8logvolit + γ9logageit
+ γ10logturnoverit + γ11shortratioit + γ12|DAccrual|it + it,
(3.3)
where ∆IORit = IORit − IORit−1; Begin(i) is a quarter dummy equals one when the
firm is a fraud firm and the quarter is in the ith quarter before fraud-beginning quarter, and
zero otherwise.
Table 9 shows the panel regression results of the change in hedge fund ownership.
Hedge funds’ net purchase is negatively related to some quarter dummies. Take model (4)
in Table 9 for example - The coefficient of 1-quarter-before-fraud dummy is -0.002, and
t-statistic is -2.34. Holding other control variables constant, the net purchase by hedge
funds in fraud firms in the quarter before fraud begins is 0.2% lower than non-fraud firms.
Considering that the average quarterly ∆ IO HF is 0.075% across all firms and all quarters
in the data, 0.2% decrease in the pre-fraud quarter accounts for 2.67 times lower than the
average. This decrease in ∆ IO HF is statistically significant at 5% level.
Moreover, the net purchase by hedge funds is associated with several firm characteris-
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tics. For instance, the net purchase by hedge funds is positively related to stock momen-
tum, stock price, firm size, book-to-market ratio, volatility, and short interest ratio, and
negatively related to stock volatility.
To make a comparison among different institutional investors, we re-run model 3.3
using net purchases by total institutional investors and non-hedge funds, and summarize
the results in Table 10.
Table 10 shows that on average, non-hedge funds and total institutional investors as
a whole do not exhibit any reductions in net purchases in the quarters before fraud is re-
vealed to the public at 5% level. But once the fraud is known, both total institutional
investors and non-hedge funds tend to decrease quarterly net purchases in the quarter of
fraud revelation and the following quarter.
3.4 Predicting Fraud with Institutional Ownership
In this Section, we adopt a logistic regression model to predict fraud. Specifically, we
run the following logistic model.
Fraudit =α + β1IORit−1 + γ1SP500it−1 + γ2MOM3it−1 + γ3MOM9it−1
+ γ4logsizeit−1 + γ5logBMit−1 + γ6logyldit−1 + γ7logprcit−1
+ γ8logvolit−1 + γ9logageit−1 + γ10logturnoverit−1 + γ11shortratioit−1
+ γ12|DAccrual|it−1 + it−1,
(3.4)
where the dependent variable (Fraud) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm is a
fraud firm and the quarter is the fraud-beginning quarter; IOR is institutional holdings
by either total institutions, non-hedge funds or hedge funds; Other parameter estimates
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consist of firm’s market variables as well as financial accounting data, which are listed in
the previous sections.
Industry and year dummies are included in the regressions. T-Statistics are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation by firm and year. The regression results
are shown in Table 11.
First, we test whether total institutional holdings can predict corporate fraud. Model
(1) in Table 11 shows the results. The coefficient of total institutional holdings is -0.094,
but is not statistically significant at 10% confidence level. Next, we split total institutional
holdings by investors’ type and calculate institutional holdings by hedge funds and non-
hedge funds for each firm. Model (2) and (3) show panel logit regression that models the
probability of fraud using non-hedge fund and hedge fund holdings, respectively. Model
(4) uses the quarterly net change of hedge fund holdings to predict corporate fraud, and
model (5) uses both hedge fund level and hedge fund holdings change to predict fraud.
Take model (3) for example - The coefficient of hedge fund holding level is -3.352,
and the t-statistic is -2.58. A higher hedge fund ownership will predict a lower probability
of conducting fraud, holding other parameters constant. To ease the interpretation of the
coefficient, we calculate an odds ratio for the hedge fund ownership coefficient. The odds
ratio for IOR HF = exp(-3.352) = 0.035. 100% increase in hedge fund holdings will
decrease the odds of conducting fraud by 96.5%. To put it another way, one standard
deviation increase in hedge fund ownership will decrease the odds of conducting fraud by
21.7%. The coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level.
Model (4) in Table 11 show that a decrease in hedge fund net purchase will indicate a
higher probability to commit fraud. One standard deviation decrease in hedge funds’ net
purchase will increase the odds of conducting fraud by 6.4%.
The results in this Section shows that hedge fund investors on average can predict
fraud, while institutional investors as a whole and non-hedge fund investors do not have
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the same kind of talent.
3.5 Alternative Hedge Fund Ownership Measures
Hedge funds show a great variation in both ability and operation focus. Hedge funds
that hold a relatively small fraction of firm shares may not have incentives to monitor the
firm closely. Similarly, hedge funds whose holdings in a firm only account for a small
portion of their assets under management may have little incentives to monitor the firm.
Therefore, we construct three alternative hedge fund holdings based on the above concerns.
Specifically, for each firm in each quarter, we sort institutional holdings into quartiles, and
then we calculate hedge funds’ holdings only for those that rank in the top quartile. We
denote this hedge fund holding as a Firm Concentrated IOR HF. Next, for each hedge fund
in each quarter, we sort firms into quartiles based on hedge funds’ dollar investment in each
firm. We only account hedge fund holdings for those firms that rank in the top quartile.
We denote this hedge fund holding as a Fund Concentrated IOR HF. Finally, the third
measure needs to meet the requirements of both firm concentrated and fund concentrated
hedge fund holdings. We denote this measure as Firm Fund IOR HF.
Overall, these measures should be better aligned with hedge funds’ incentives to mon-
itor the firms they invest with closely. Table 12 shows summary statistics of hedge fund
ownership across the three measures at both pre-fraud quarter end (Panel A) and pre-
revelation quarter end (Panel B). Panel A in Table 12 shows that all three alternative mea-
sures are more right-skewed (or positive skewed) than total hedge fund holdings.
In this Section, we repeat the regressions in Section 3.2, with the three alternative
hedge fund ownership measures as the dependent variables. Model (1) in Table 13 is the
regression of original hedge fund holdings on firm characteristics. Models (2) - (4) regress
the three alternative hedge fund holdings on firm controls, respectively. As expected all
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coefficients on fraud related dummy variables are negative and statistically significant at
1% or 5% levels. Using Model (4) as an example, the dependent variable is firm and
fund concentrated hedge fund ownership. The coefficient of the violation period dummy
is -0.009 (t-statistic=-4.8). Since the mean of the firm and fund concentrated hedge fund
ownership is 1.35% over the sample, 0.9% decrease in fraud firms over the course of fraud
accounts for a notable 66.7% decrease, which is almost twice size of decrease by using
total hedge funds’ ownership (34%).
The results in this Section show that hedge funds with greater incentives to moni-
tor firms will unload even more holdings in fraud firms around violation periods than all
hedge funds do.
3.6 Cross-sectional Test of Fraud Severity on Hedge FundOwnership Level Around
Fraud Beginning Period
Previous tests show that hedge funds have certain skills to avoid investing with fraud
firms. It could be possible that hedge fund investors do not possess any specific knowledge
of the fraud, and merely unload shares in anticipation of large stock price decline. To
distinguish between hedge funds’ ability to detect misconduct and the above competing
interpretation, we find a direct measure misconduct severity and test whether hedge funds’
ownership is associated with fraud severity. To answer this question, we follow Karpoff
and Lou (2010) and conduct a similar cross-sectional regression as below.
IOR HFi =α + γ1Total Finei + γ2MOM3i + γ3MOM9i + γ4logsizei + γ5logBMi
+ γ6Shortratioi + γ6|DAccrual|i + it,
(3.5)
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where Total Fine is the total monetary penalty imposed by authorities scaled by the mar-
ket capitalization at the testing periods; Mom3, Mom9, logsize, logBM, short ratio, and
discretionary accrual are firm characteristics measured at the same measurement period.
We run the cross-sectional regression in five different quarters separately, which range
from two quarters before fraud begins to two quarters after misconduct starts. The results
are shown in Table 14.
The results show that the coefficients in all the five regressions are negative and signif-
icant. For example, in the quarter when fraud starts, the coefficient of total fine is -0.005
(t-statistics=-3.13.). A 1% increase in the final fine will be associated with a 0.5% decrease
in institutional ownership. The result is both economically and statistically significant.
The results in Table 14 lead to the conclusion that hedge funds’ ownership is nega-
tively associated with the severity of fraud. More severe fraudulent activities in terms of
the penalty imposed by authorities will attract less investment by hedge funds. The con-
clusion supports that hedge fund has particular ability to detect financial fraud.
3.7 Regulation Fair Disclosure as A Quasi-Natural Experiment
The SEC promulgated the Regulation Fair Disclosure in October 2000. The regula-
tion mandates that all publicly traded companies must disclose material information to
all investors at the same time. If hedge fund investors are skilled at collecting private in-
formation about firms, the pass of Regulation FD will weaken hedge fund’s comparative
advantage over other institutional investors on obtaining private information.
From the previous results, we show that hedge funds are proficient at detecting fi-
nancial fraud. In this Section, we study whether Regulation FD will have an effect on
institutional investors’ ability to detect financial fraud. Specifically, we run the regression
models as below.
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IORit =α + β1Begin(−1)it + β2(RegFD)it + β3Begin(−1)it ∗RegFDit
+ γ1SP500it + γ2MOM3it + γ3MOM9it + γ4logsizeit
+ γ5logBMit + γ6logyldit + γ7logprcit + γ8logvolit + γ9logageit
+ γ10logturnoverit + γ11shortratioit + γ12|DAccrual|it + it,
(3.6)
and
IORit =α + β1V iolationPeriodDummyit + β2(RegFD)it
+ β3V iolationPeriodDummyit ∗RegFDit
+ γ1SP500it + γ2MOM3it + γ3MOM9it + γ4logsizeit
+ γ5logBMit + γ6logyldit + γ7logprcit + γ8logvolit + γ9logageit
+ γ10logturnoverit + γ11shortratioit + γ12|DAccrual|it + it,
(3.7)
where Reg FD is the Regulation FD dummy equals one for the quarters after the year
2000, and zero otherwise. Begin(-1) is one quarter before fraud dummy that equals one if
the quarter is the pre-fraud quarter and the firm is a fraud firm. Violation Period dummy
is a dummy that equals one for all quarters during the violation and the firm is a fraud
firm. Begin(-1)*reg FD is the interaction of Reg FD dummy and pre-fraud quarter dummy.
Violation Period*reg FD is the interaction of Reg FD dummy and violation period dummy.
IOR is institutional ownership by total institutions, non-hedge funds, and hedge funds.
Models (1) – (3) in Table 15 are based on the regression model 3.6. The coefficient
of 1-quarter-before-fraud dummy by hedge fund is -0.006, and is statistically significant
at 5% level. The coefficient on the interaction term of Reg FD and 1-qtr-before-fraud
is -0.002, but not significant. In contrast, the coefficient of 1-qtr-before-fraud dummy
for either total institutional investors or non-hedge fund investors is significant. But the
coefficient of the interaction term is significant for both total and non-hedge institutional
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investors. For example, the coefficient of 1-qtr-before-fraudxReg FD is -0.043 for non-
hedge fund investors. Though non-hedge fund investors do not have any significant change
in their holdings in fraud firms before Regulation FD, they reduce their ownership in fraud
firms by 4.3% in the quarter immediately before fraud begins after the Regulation FD.
Models (4) – (6) in Table 15 are based on the model 3.7. Hedge funds show a similar
pattern in the regression that they have 1% less ownership during violation period, and this
reduction pattern is not affected by the pass of Regulation FD.
The results in this Section indicate that hedge funds’ skills in predicting fraud are
not affected by the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure. But the passage of
Reg FD reduces the barrier for non-hedge funds in gathering information, and as a result,
non-hedge funds start to show tendency to reduce ownership in fraud firms in the quarter
immediately prior to the beginning of fraud.
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4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate whether hedge funds, presumably most sophisticated in-
vestors, have the ability to avoid investing in the firms that conduct financial misconduct.
The prior research has shown that many hedge funds can deliver superior performance, that
a portion of hedge funds have the skill to predict market conditions, and that hedge fund
activists can significantly influence corporate operations. Given the evidence, one would
expect that if a group of institutional investors can predict corporate fraud, they are most
likely hedge funds. In our study, therefore, we not only test the fraud-detection ability of
hedge funds but make a comparison between hedge funds and other types of institutional
investors. Using 13F quarterly holdings data from 1980 to 2012, we first find that hedge
funds have significantly lower ownership in fraud firms since four quarters before fraud
starts, and the lower holdings in fraud firms continue over the violation period, which
ranges from the fraud-beginning quarter to the end of fraud quarter. However, non-hedge
funds (i.e., banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, investment advisors, and other in-
stitutional investors combined) do not show any significant pattern in their holdings in
fraud firms around violation period.
Second, we employ a panel logit regression on modeling the probability of fraud. We
find that both hedge fund level and change are associated with the likelihood of conducting
fraud. One standard deviation increase in hedge fund ownership will decrease the odds of
committing fraud by 21.7%. Also, one standard deviation increase in net hedge fund
purchase indicates a decrease in the odds of conducting fraud by 6.4%.
Third, we test the relationship between fraudulent severity and hedge fund holdings.
With a proxy for fraud severity, we find that, in cross-section, hedge funds invest less in
firms whose fraudulent activities are proved to be more severe, ex-post. Fourth, given the
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fact that hedge funds show significant variations in their ability, and operation focus, we
develop three alternative hedge fund holdings’ measures that are more aligned with their
incentives to monitor. We find that hedge funds with greater incentives to monitor firms
show larger ownership decrease in fraud firms around violation period.
Fourth, we show that Regulation Fair Disclosure will not significantly impede hedge
fund managers’ ability to detect financial misconduct. The finding suggests that hedge
funds’ ability to divest from fraud firms before misconduct begins may not come purely
from information-driven strategy.
Taken together, the results suggest that hedge funds have the ability to divest from fraud
firms around violation period in anticipation of fraudulent activities. However, non-hedge
funds do not have such ability, and the pattern of stock ownership by non-hedge funds in
fraud firms suggests that non-hedge funds primarily react to the public news instead of
possessing superior information about firms.
Finally, there are several directions to conduct further research. For instance, one
can examine if the physical proximity of a hedge fund to the fraud firm’s headquarter is
related to the fund’s ability to detect corporate misconduct. Another interesting test is
to examine the actual stock return pattern of those fraud firms after hedge funds reduce
their ownership. In conclusion, investigating the link between institutional investors and
corporate fraudulent behavior could be a fertile area for future research.
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Figure 1: This figure illustrates a timeline of an enforcement action. A typical misconduct
will include a violation beginning date, on which a misconduct begins, a violation ending
date, on which misconduct finishes, then come with a revelation event that misconduct is
revealed to public, followed by SEC investigation on a later period.
35
Figure 2: This figure plots the distribution of misconduct across Fama-French 48 Industries
at the pre-fraud month. The sample period is from 1980Q1 through 2012Q4.
The definition of Fama-French 48 Industries can be found at Kenneth French’s website
Brief definitions are shown below: 1 Agric Agriculture, 2 Food Food Products, 3 Soda Candy & Soda, 4 Beer
Beer & Liquor, 5 Smoke Tobacco Products, 6 Toys Recreation, 7 Fun Entertainment, 8 Books Printing and
Publishing, 9 Hshld Consumer Goods, 10 Clths Apparel, 11 Hlth Healthcare, 12 MedEq Medical Equip-
ment, 13 Drugs Pharmaceutical Products, 14 Chems Chemicals, 15 Rubbr Rubber and Plastic Products,
16 Txtls Textiles, 17 BldMt Construction Materials, 18 Cnstr Construction, 19 Steel Steel Works Etc, 20
FabPr Fabricated Products, 21 Mach Machinery, 22 ElcEq Electrical Equipment, 23 Autos Automobiles and
Trucks, 24 Aero Aircraft, 25 Ships Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment, 26 Guns Defense, 27 Gold Precious
Metals, 28 Mines Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining, 29 Coal Coal, 30 Oil Petroleum and Natural
Gas, 31 Util Utilities, 32 Telcm Communication, 33 PerSv Personal Services, 34 BusSv Business Services,
35 Comps Computers, 36 Chips Electronic Equipment, 37 LabEq Measuring and Control Equipment, 38
Paper Business Supplies, 39 Boxes Shipping Containers, 40 Trans Transportation, 41 Whlsl Wholesale, 42
Rtail Retail, 43 Meals Restaurants, Hotels, Motels, 44 Banks Banking, 45 Insur Insurance, 46 RlEst Real
Estate, 47 Fin Trading, 48 Other Almost Nothing.
36
Figure 3: This figure plots the distribution of misconduct across Fama-French 48 Industries
at the pre-revelation month. The sample period is from 1980Q1 through 2012Q4.
The definition of Fama-French 48 Industries can be found at Kenneth French’s website
Brief definitions are shown below: 1 Agric Agriculture, 2 Food Food Products, 3 Soda Candy & Soda, 4 Beer
Beer & Liquor, 5 Smoke Tobacco Products, 6 Toys Recreation, 7 Fun Entertainment, 8 Books Printing and
Publishing, 9 Hshld Consumer Goods, 10 Clths Apparel, 11 Hlth Healthcare, 12 MedEq Medical Equip-
ment, 13 Drugs Pharmaceutical Products, 14 Chems Chemicals, 15 Rubbr Rubber and Plastic Products,
16 Txtls Textiles, 17 BldMt Construction Materials, 18 Cnstr Construction, 19 Steel Steel Works Etc, 20
FabPr Fabricated Products, 21 Mach Machinery, 22 ElcEq Electrical Equipment, 23 Autos Automobiles and
Trucks, 24 Aero Aircraft, 25 Ships Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment, 26 Guns Defense, 27 Gold Precious
Metals, 28 Mines Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining, 29 Coal Coal, 30 Oil Petroleum and Natural
Gas, 31 Util Utilities, 32 Telcm Communication, 33 PerSv Personal Services, 34 BusSv Business Services,
35 Comps Computers, 36 Chips Electronic Equipment, 37 LabEq Measuring and Control Equipment, 38
Paper Business Supplies, 39 Boxes Shipping Containers, 40 Trans Transportation, 41 Whlsl Wholesale, 42
Rtail Retail, 43 Meals Restaurants, Hotels, Motels, 44 Banks Banking, 45 Insur Insurance, 46 RlEst Real
Estate, 47 Fin Trading, 48 Other Almost Nothing.
37
Figure 4: This figure illustrates the frequency of misconduct cases by fraud beginning
year.The sample period is from 1980 through 2012. The majority of violations occurred
between 1998 and 2001.
38
Figure 5: This figure illustrates the frequency of misconduct cases by fraud revelation year.
The majority of violations was revealed to the public between 2000 and 2002, as well as
2005 and 2006.
39
Figure 6: This figure shows the evolution of average stock ownership by various types of
institutional investors, including banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, hedge funds,




Table 1: Description of Financial Misconduct Sample
This table reports the number of samples firms, violation period in terms of months (vi-
olation period is from the date when firm begins fraud until the last date when firm ends
fraudulent action), period from violation beginning to the date violation is revealed to
public. In the last two columns total fines imposed on firms in the sample are reported.
Violation Period From Violation Total Fine
Beginning to Public
Revelation
N (Months) (Months) (Millions)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Panel Regression of Hedge Fund Ownership Around Violation Period
This table reports results of panel regressions of hedge fund ownership level around vio-
lation period. Violation period is defined as the period from fraud beginning to the end
of the fraudulent action. The violation period dummy equals to one for each quarter dur-
ing violation period for each fraud firm, and zero otherwise. Quarter, Fama-French 48
industry and firm fixed effects are included. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by both firm and quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IOR HF IOR HF IOR HF IOR HF
4 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005** -0.007***
(-2.61) (-3.08) (-2.23) (-2.72)
3 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.004** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.007**
(-2.42) (-2.84) (-2.21) (-2.50)
2 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.004** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.007**
(-2.46) (-2.65) (-2.37) (-2.32)
1 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009***
(-2.83) (-3.11) (-3.27) (-3.47)
Violation Period Dummy -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.011***
(-3.45) (-4.24) (-3.52) (-4.74)
45
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SP500 -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.020*** -0.018***
(-7.93) (-7.66) (-8.20) (-7.32)
MOM3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(-0.41) (0.90) (-0.38) (0.82)
MOM9 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001*
(-0.68) (1.20) (-0.04) (1.79)
Log(Size) 0.002*** 0.001 0.002** 0.000
(3.16) (1.43) (2.03) (0.55)
Log(Book-to-market) 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001*
(3.85) (4.26) (1.91) (1.94)
Log(Dividend Yield) -0.069*** -0.081*** -0.069*** -0.080***
(-5.77) (-5.83) (-4.42) (-4.59)
Log(Price) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(5.49) (5.38) (5.84) (5.60)
Log(Volatility) 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(1.17) (0.25) (-0.26) (-1.26)
Log(Age) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(9.48) (8.83) (9.03) (7.63)
Log(Turnover) 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.014***
(9.32) (6.30) (7.44) (4.39)
Quarter Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 521,594 402,202 320,528 263,034
adj. R2 0.629 0.620 0.642 0.631
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 6: Panel Regression of Non-Hedge Fund Ownership Around Fraud-Beginning Pe-
riod
This table reports results of panel regressions of institutional ownership level around vi-
olation period. Violation period is defined as the period from fraud beginning to the end
of fraudulent action. The dependent variables are quarterly institutional ownership level
for All institutional holdings (IOR TOTAL) and Non-hedge funds (IOR NonHF). Quarter,
Fama-French 48 industry and firm fixed effects are included. T-statistics in parentheses are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by both firm and quarter.
(1) (2)
IOR TOTAL IOR NonHF
4 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.008 -0.001
(-0.81) (-0.09)
3 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.009 -0.002
(-0.84) (-0.17)
2 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.003 0.003
(-0.30) (0.29)
1 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.015 -0.006
(-1.43) (-0.61)




























Quarter Dummy Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Firm Dummy Yes Yes
N 263,034 263,034
adj. R2 0.865 0.854
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 7: Panel Regression of Hedge Fund Ownership Around Fraud-Revelation Period
This table reports results of panel regressions around the quarter when misconduct is re-
vealed to the public. The independent variables of interest are dummy variables for four
pre-revelation quarters, one fraud revelation quarter, and four post-revelation quarters.
Firm characteristics controls are included. Quarter, Fama-French 48 industry and firm
fixed effects are included. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity
and within correlation clustered by both firm and quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IOR HF IOR HF IOR HF IOR HF
4 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.004** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.009***
(-2.37) (-2.94) (-2.75) (-3.79)
3 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.005** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.012***
(-2.32) (-2.88) (-3.04) (-4.59)
2 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.004* -0.008*** -0.006** -0.011***
(-1.86) (-3.16) (-2.33) (-4.12)
1 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.001 -0.006* -0.002 -0.007**
(-0.47) (-1.97) (-0.59) (-2.42)
Fraud Revelation Qtr Dummy 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.004
(0.74) (-0.77) (0.84) (-1.19)
1 qtr after Revelation Dummy 0.004 0.002 0.007* 0.003
(1.25) (0.62) (1.67) (0.81)
2 qtr after Revelation Dummy 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.002
(1.06) (0.33) (1.28) (0.46)
3 qtr after Revelation Dummy 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.86) (0.71) (0.86) (0.76)
4 qtr after Revelation Dummy 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
(1.24) (1.24) (0.94) (1.02)
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SP500 -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.020*** -0.018***
(-7.95) (-7.68) (-8.21) (-7.34)
MOM3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(-0.35) (0.91) (-0.33) (0.82)
MOM9 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001*
(-0.63) (1.22) (-0.00) (1.82)
Log(Size) 0.002*** 0.001 0.002* 0.000
(3.09) (1.37) (1.95) (0.46)
Log(Book-to-market) 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001*
(3.85) (4.29) (1.94) (1.98)
Log(Dividend Yield) -0.069*** -0.081*** -0.069*** -0.079***
(-5.77) (-5.83) (-4.41) (-4.58)
Log(Price) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(5.50) (5.38) (5.87) (5.62)
Log(Volatility) 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(1.14) (0.22) (-0.29) (-1.29)
Log(Age) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(9.49) (8.83) (9.04) (7.62)
Log(Turnover) 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.014***
(9.32) (6.29) (7.43) (4.38)
Quarter Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 521,594 402,202 320,528 263,034
adj. R2 0.629 0.620 0.642 0.631
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 8: Panel Regression of Non-Hedge Fund Ownership Around Fraud-Revelation Pe-
riod
This table reports results of panel regressions around the quarter when misconduct is re-
vealed to the public. The dependent variables are quarterly institutional ownership level
for Non-hedge funds (IOR NonHF) and All institutional holdings (IOR TOTAL). The in-
dependent variables of interest are dummy variables for four pre-revelation quarters, one
fraud revelation quarter, and four post-revelation quarters. Firm characteristics controls are
included. Quarter, Fama-French 48 industry and firm fixed effects are included. T-statistics
in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by both
firm and quarter.
(1) (2)
IOR TOTAL IOR NonHF
4 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.012 -0.002
(-1.34) (-0.31)
3 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.018* -0.006
(-1.93) (-0.77)
2 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.020** -0.008
(-2.21) (-1.07)
1 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.023** -0.015*
(-2.38) (-1.77)
Fraud Revelation Qtr Dummy -0.024** -0.021**
(-2.51) (-2.33)
1 qtr after Revelation Dummy -0.024*** -0.027***
(-2.71) (-3.47)
2 qtr after Revelation Dummy -0.029*** -0.031***
(-2.90) (-3.47)
3 qtr after Revelation Dummy -0.021** -0.024***
(-2.36) (-3.07)



























Quarter Dummy Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Firm Dummy Yes Yes
N 263,034 263,034
adj. R2 0.865 0.854
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 9: Panel Regression of Changes in Hedge Fund Ownership Around Violation Period
period dummy plus firm characteristics. Violation period starts from fraud beginning to
the end of fraudulent activity. The violation period dummy equals to 1 for each quarter
during violation period for each fraud firm, and zero otherwise. Quarter, Fama-French 48
industry and firm fixed effects are included. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by both firm and quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IOR HF ∆IOR HF ∆IOR HF ∆IOR HF
4 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002*
(-2.14) (-2.20) (-1.86) (-1.80)
3 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.60) (-0.64) (-1.40) (-1.35)
2 qtr before Fraud Dummy 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.09) (0.14) (-0.01) (-0.08)
1 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002**
(-0.99) (-1.09) (-1.91) (-2.34)
Violation Period Dummy -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001
(-0.90) (-1.69) (-0.65) (-1.53)
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SP500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.76) (1.11) (0.71) (1.21)
MOM3 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(11.70) (9.26) (10.29) (8.41)
MOM9 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(3.53) (3.38) (2.74) (2.84)
Log(Size) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000**
(-1.06) (-0.98) (-1.97) (-2.40)
Log(Book-to-market) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(3.82) (4.09) (3.88) (3.81)
Log(Dividend Yield) 0.005** 0.006** 0.004 0.005
(2.30) (2.58) (1.20) (1.36)
Log(Price) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(7.65) (6.82) (7.46) (6.90)
Log(Volatility) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(4.62) (4.74) (3.77) (3.68)
Log(Age) 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(2.39) (1.49) (1.83) (1.24)
Log(Turnover) -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(-3.66) (-3.80) (-3.54) (-3.52)
Quarter Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 517312 398252 318391 260929
adj. R2 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.016
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 10: Panel Regression of Changes in Non-Hedge Fund Ownership
This table reports results of panel regressions of institutional ownership level on violation
period dummy plus firm characteristics. Violation period starts from fraud beginning to the
end of fraudulent action. The violation period dummy equals to 1 for each quarter during
violation period for each fraud firm, and zero otherwise. The dependent variables are
quarterly institutional ownership level for hedge funds (IOR HF), mutual funds (IOR MF),
Non-hedge funds (IOR NonHF) and All institutional holdings (IOR TOTAL). Quarter,
Fama-French 48 industry and firm fixed effects are included. T-statistics in parentheses are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by both firm and quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆IOR TOTAL ∆IOR NonHF ∆IOR TOTAL ∆IOR NonHF
4 qtr before Fraud Dummy 0.002 0.004
(0.43) (1.00)
3 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.001 0.001
(-0.15) (0.20)
2 qtr before Fraud Dummy 0.005 0.005
(1.12) (1.18)
1 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.001 0.001
(-0.21) (0.37)
Violation Period Dummy 0.001 0.002
(0.85) (1.31)
4 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.002 -0.000
(-0.43) (-0.07)
3 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.006* -0.004
(-1.88) (-1.30)
2 qtr before Revelation Dummy 0.002 0.002
(0.46) (0.70)
1 qtr before Revelation Dummy -0.004 -0.006
(-0.65) (-1.02)
Fraud Revelation Qtr Dummy -0.025*** -0.027***
(-3.46) (-3.88)
1 qtr after Revelation Dummy -0.009** -0.013***
(-2.43) (-3.16)
2 qtr after Revelation Dummy -0.003 -0.005
(-0.81) (-1.13)
3 qtr after Revelation Dummy 0.002 0.000
(0.39) (0.06)




Short ratio 0.077*** 0.066*** 0.078*** 0.067***
(6.05) (5.94) (6.10) (6.00)
|DAccruals| 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.000
(1.74) (1.04) (1.74) (1.04)
SP500 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(1.46) (1.07) (1.51) (1.12)
MOM3 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.017***
(13.14) (12.95) (13.12) (12.92)
MOM9 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(8.72) (7.44) (8.71) (7.43)
Log(Size) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(-4.87) (-4.59) (-4.83) (-4.51)
Log(Book-to-market) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(4.67) (2.96) (4.64) (2.93)
Log(Dividend Yield) 0.015 0.010 0.015 0.010
(1.37) (1.00) (1.36) (0.98)
Log(Price) 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(17.55) (16.49) (17.54) (16.50)
Log(Volatility) -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001*
(-0.38) (-1.84) (-0.36) (-1.81)
Log(Age) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(-5.86) (-6.23) (-5.84) (-6.20)
Log(Turnover) -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.024***
(-9.30) (-9.33) (-9.31) (-9.33)
Quarter Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 260,929 260,929 260,929 260,929
adj. R2 0.088 0.084 0.088 0.084
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 11: Logit Regression Modeling the Probability of Fraud
This table reports results of a logit regression modeling the probability of fraud. The de-
pendent variable is a binary variable that equals one if a firm conduct fraud in the quarter,
and 0 otherwise. Parameter estimates include institutional ownership level and change,
plus firm characteristics. A year and Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects are included.
T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within correlation clus-
tered by both firm and quarter.





IOR HF -3.352*** -3.077**
(-2.58) (-2.32)
∆IOR HF -2.947** -1.928
(-2.29) (-1.10)
Short ratio 6.580*** 6.390*** 7.055*** 6.635*** 7.154***
(2.97) (2.89) (3.43) (3.19) (3.48)
|DAccruals| 0.198 0.198 0.194 0.197 0.192
(1.05) (1.04) (1.02) (1.04) (1.02)
SP500 0.057 0.061 0.006 0.057 0.007
(0.30) (0.32) (0.03) (0.31) (0.04)
MOM3 0.150 0.159 0.141 0.164 0.149
(1.02) (1.09) (0.99) (1.17) (1.08)
MOM9 0.056 0.059 0.054 0.060 0.057
(0.74) (0.78) (0.76) (0.90) (0.85)
Log(Size) 0.316*** 0.310*** 0.315*** 0.314*** 0.316***
(5.03) (4.82) (5.13) (4.97) (5.13)
Log(Book-to-market) -0.046 -0.053 -0.033 -0.049 -0.034
(-0.58) (-0.66) (-0.45) (-0.67) (-0.46)
Log(Dividend Yield) -5.375 -5.226 -5.741 -5.280 -5.708
(-0.91) (-0.89) (-0.98) (-0.90) (-0.96)
Log(Price) -0.010 -0.025 0.005 -0.015 0.006
(-0.07) (-0.17) (0.05) (-0.13) (0.05)
Log(Volatility) 0.380 0.390 0.384 0.384 0.383
(1.51) (1.54) (1.48) (1.47) (1.47)
Log(Age) -0.075 -0.075 -0.080 -0.078 -0.083
(-0.94) (-0.95) (-1.01) (-1.00) (-1.05)
Log(Turnover) -0.159 -0.198 -0.069 -0.167 -0.069
(-0.21) (-0.26) (-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.09)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 202,844 202,844 202,844 201,760 201,760
pseudo R2 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.079























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13: Panel Regression Using Alternative Hedge Fund Ownership Measures
This table reports results of panel regressions of hedge fund ownership level on violation
period dummy plus firm characteristics. Model (1) shows the regression result of total
hedge fund ownership level on violation period dummy and firm characteristics. Model (2)
uses hedge funds whose holdings are ranked in the top quartile in the firm. Model (3) uses
hedge funds whose holdings in the firm account for the top quartile of their AUM. Model
(4) uses regression results of hedge funds that meet the requirements of both hedge funds
ownership measures in Model (2) and (3). Quarter and Fama-French 48 industry and firm
fixed effects are included. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity
and within correlation clustered by both firm and quarter.









4 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.007*** -0.007** -0.006*** -0.006***
(-2.72) (-2.58) (-2.79) (-2.76)
3 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.007** -0.007*** -0.005** -0.006**
(-2.50) (-2.64) (-2.36) (-2.46)
2 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.007** -0.006** -0.006*** -0.006***
(-2.32) (-2.30) (-2.98) (-3.00)
1 qtr before Fraud Dummy -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(-3.47) (-3.95) (-4.69) (-4.80)
Violation Period Dummy -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(-4.74) (-4.90) (-5.43) (-5.50)
59
Table 13 Continued
Short ratio 0.205*** 0.172*** 0.109*** 0.104***
(12.27) (11.78) (10.02) (9.94)
|DAccruals| -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001*
(-1.16) (-1.24) (-1.77) (-1.72)
SP500 -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(-7.32) (-5.76) (-5.10) (-4.59)
MOM3 0.000 0.001 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.82) (1.25) (5.65) (5.42)
MOM9 0.001* 0.000 0.001*** 0.001**
(1.79) (1.26) (2.63) (2.27)
Log(Size) 0.000 0.001 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.55) (0.62) (8.38) (7.82)
Log(Book-to-market) 0.001* 0.001 0.001*** 0.001***
(1.94) (1.46) (3.95) (3.79)
Log(Dividend Yield) -0.080*** -0.073*** -0.058*** -0.055***
(-4.59) (-4.40) (-5.00) (-4.79)
Log(Price) 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(5.60) (3.60) (6.58) (6.11)
Log(Volatility) -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002***
(-1.26) (-1.35) (-4.46) (-4.09)
Log(Age) 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.002** 0.002**
(7.63) (6.79) (2.45) (2.27)
Log(Turnover) 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(4.39) (3.33) (3.69) (3.17)
Quarter Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 263,034 263,034 263,034 263,034
adj. R2 0.631 0.601 0.520 0.509
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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